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Abstract
In this paper we build a dynamic trade model to investigate
the relation between trade and the environment in a dynamic
setting. We extend a trade model similar to Copeland & Taylor
(2003) by adding capital accumulation. We characterize optimal
environmental policy in autarky and under international trade.
Then we analyze the e¤ects of parameter di¤erences across coun-
tries on steady state specialization patterns.
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1 Introduction
Today, a couple of decades into their industrial revolutions, China has
1.3 billion people and India 1.1 billion. What these two countries jointly
pursue is growth on a scale that is more than 200 times larger than
what the UK and the US managed during their industrial revolutions.
Well-informed observers of Chindia argue that Chindia will avoid.. (en-
vironmental) disasters by learning to price ... scarce resources (especially
water) appropriately. Chindia will not have a century or more to gure
out how to make growth environmentally sustainable a process still far
from complete in the UK and the US. They have less than a decade.[
Willem Buiter (2007),The Browning of Chindia].
The East Asian Miracleis a topic in recent economic history that
has received considerable attention from the economic profession. It tells
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an interesting story of a collection of export-oriented economies that have
had high growth rates for more than three decades. It ts in a larger
series of events in global economic development and encompasses various
post-war economic trends. Among these trends that are conrmed by
the empirical data are the conditional convergence of open economies,
the increase in the volume of world trade and, in a seemingly whole
other sphere of interest, the steady degradation of the global environ-
ment according to various ecological indicators. Conditional convergence
explains how poor countries that are open to trade grow faster than their
high-income partners. This process has been accompanied by increases
in the volume of trade between high-income countries and the newcom-
ers. It has, however, not yet been made clear how the various polluting
industries, one of the root causes of global environmental degredation,
are distributed across trading partners over time. So far this focus is
understandable from an empirical point of view: the growth experience
that we have referred to is that of a number of relatively small economies.
Their joint impact on world aggregates, be it economic or environmental,
is very modest.
None of this holds true whatsoever for the growth process of Chin-
dia; together, China and India hold more than 1/3th of the worlds
population. Chinas rise to its role as the manufacturer of the world,
as it is often denoted in the popular press, is unprecedented in terms of
both speed and scale. As with the East-Asian miracle, many argue that
Chinas process of development is characterized by trade-led growth with
growth rates that exceed those of its most important trade partners, the
European Union and the United States, by several percent points.
Our analysis is a rst attempt to capture these recent facts in eco-
nomic history and, more generally, to provide for a dynamic perspec-
tive of the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). The framework that we
propose could be a rst step towards a more comprehensive theory of
pollution havens; one that pays particular attention to i) economic dy-
namics and ii) the increasing importance of international trade in the
world economy, not only in nal goods but also in intermediate goods,
ideas, factors of production etc. This proces of global integration is, in
contrast to what some might think (see for example Friedman (2005))
not completed. From a theoretical point of view this implies that the
world is still far from the hypothetical integrated world equilibrium
that trade theorists are so fond of (Dixit&Norman, 1981;Ventura, 2005).
Therefore, our approach seems relevant.
This paper incorporates optimal saving and investment behavior into
a 222 Heckscher-Ohlin framework with environmental damage from
pollution. With the dynamic trade model that is obtained we derive the
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necessary conditions, related to demand side and supply side parameters,
under which a country can become a net exporter of the dirty good,
i.e. a pollution haven. We do this in a setting where (i) both sectors of
production make use of a polluting factor of production, (ii) the pollution
that is generated by production is local in nature and (iii) environmental
policy is endogenous. Our paper adds to the literature by emphasizing
the deeper determinants of specialization patterns and pollution havens,
especially the subjective time discount rate. In the steady state the
relatively impatient country might specialize in the dirty good. While
some of our results relate to previous models in the literature, other
results are new and provide for interesting avenues in future research.
We also sketch how the model potentially could be extended to analyze
some positive and normative questions related to income convergence,
convergence of industry emission intensities and trade.
2 Overview of the literature
Our paper contributes to several strands in the literature. First, there
is a by now enormous literature on the relationship between interna-
tional trade and the environment. The main question here is whether
trade, through its e¤ects on the scale, the composition and the location
of economic activity, is benecial for the environment. Seminal contri-
butions in this eld are by Grossman&Krueger(1994), Copeland&Taylor
(1994, 2003, 2004) and Antweiler et al. (2000). Copeland&Taylor (1994)
analyze the relationship between trade and the environment in a North-
South Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods, following Dorn-
busch et al. (1977). They assume that North and South di¤er in terms
of technology (or human capital). As a result North has a higher level
of income. Under endogenous environmental policy the income di¤er-
ence implies that the North sets a more stringent environmental policy.
This mechanism creates an income-induced comparative advantage for
the North in the clean good. Due to its lower level of income and less
stringent environmental policy the South becomes a net exporter of dirty
goods. Thus, their model is an elaborate example of the pollution haven
hypothesis; low-income, labour abundant countries will specialize in the
production of dirty goods. In Copeland & Taylor (2003) the focus shifts
towards the factor endowment hypothesis that states the exact opposite:
high-income and capital-abundant countries will become a net exporter
of dirty goods. It is now recognized that, at least in theory, these two
countervailing forces that are exerted through a countrys capital-labour
ratio jointly determine the specialization pattern in open economies.
A second strand of the literature that is important for our work is con-
cerned with capital accumulation in open economies. Since the interest
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rate in open economies is determined by the terms of trade, the process
of growth through capital accumulation is distinct from that in closed
economies. Seminal publications in the eld of dynamic H-O models
are by Oniki&Uzawa (1965) and Stiglitz (1970). These authors assume
exogenous savings rates as in Solow (1956). Cross-country di¤erences
in savings rates imply that, even though the long-term balanced growth
rate is exogenous and equal to the rate of technological progress, the
steady state capital-labor ratio will di¤er between countries. Thus, pro-
duction patterns will be distinct even in the steady state. More recently
Baxter (1992) and Ono&Shibata (2006), among others, have incorpo-
rated intertemporal optimization behavior to endogenize saving rates.
Classical Ricardian properties such as perfect specialization reemerge
in this context since the steady state interest rate, and therefore the
capital-labour ratio, are xed by the rate of time preference. This fea-
ture sets these models apart from their predecessors with exogenous
saving rates. Dynamic H-O models are also being used for a variety
of more specialized topics, such as endogenous growth with both hu-
man capital and physical capital accumulation (Bond et al., 2003), scal
policy and global welfare analysis (Ono&Shibata, 2005), trade, growth
and convergence (Ventura, 1997, Acemoglu&Ventura, 2002) and, nally,
status-seeking and catching-up (Hu&Shimomura, 2007). Thus, the dy-
namic H-O model has become a very important tool for studying the
short-run and long-run determinants of comparative advantage in rela-
tion to other important questions in dynamic economic theory.
Here we apply dynamic H-O theory to analyze the relationship be-
tween international trade and the environment with endogenous envi-
ronmental policy. Our paper is somewhat related to a recent paper by
Umanskaya & Barbier (2008). They introduce the concept of a true pol-
lution haven: a situation in which a country specializes completely in the
production of dirty goods. Remember that the standard denition of a
pollution haven was less restrictive: A country that, because of its weak
or poorly enforced environmental regulations, attracts industries that
pollute the environment(Deardo¤, 2001). This denition, however, has
nothing to say on the overall production pattern of a particular coun-
try. Umanskaya & Barbier (2008) use a static two-country trade model
to show that true pollution havens can be obtained as the outcome of
di¤erences in factor endowments and income generated di¤erences in
environmental policy. Their result is caused by the assumption of suf-
ciently large di¤erences in factor endowments such that factor price
equalization is not obtained. Then the implications of the model are in
line with Ricardian trade theory: at least one of the two countries be-
comes completely specialized. In our model we derive a dynamic version
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of this proposition that is even sharper: an innitely small di¤erence
in the subjective discount rate or technology assures that at least one
country becomes a true pollution haven in the steady state.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our dynamic
trade model. In section 3 we discuss the properties of the steady state in
autarky. In section 4 we move to a situation with international trade. It
is shown that even the slightest di¤erence in the rate of time preference
across countries will cause at least one country to specialize completely in
the steady state. We derive necessary conditions for the various types of
pollution havens and show some examples. In section 4 we explain how
to extend the current model in order to study the e¤ects of environmental
policy on growth convergence. Section 5 concludes.
3 A Ramsey-Heckscher-Ohlin model with pollution
We formulate a dynamic trade model in continuous time. There are
two countries, Home and Foreign. Foreign variables are denoted with
an asterisk (*). Two goods, a relatively clean good (X) and a relatively
dirty good (Y ), are produced using two factors of production, a clean
factor and a dirty factor. We assume that the production of the dirty
(clean) good is relatively intensive in the dirty (clean) factor of produc-
tion. These factors can be interpreted as respectively physical capital
(K) and emission permits (Z). The initial capital stock is given:K0: The
clean good is the numeraire and serves a dual function: it is suitable for
both investment (I) and consumption (Cx). The dirty good can only be
used for consumption (Cy). Such a distinction between the two goods is
common in the literature on dynamic H-O models. On the consumption
side each household determines its composition of consumption (C) and
the path of private assets (A). Households take the level of environmen-
tal quality as given. The level of environmental quality is proportional
to the level of ow pollution. Pollution is proportional to the use of the
dirty input. The government sets the price of emissions (#) to balance
the benets and costs of ow pollution. Pollution damage is local only.
In the following we describe the home economy. The foreign economy is
similar.
3.1 Consumption
There is an innitely lived agent who cares only about his or her con-
sumption and environmental quality. Flow pollution is assumed to be
harmful for the consumer. Lifetime welfare (t) of the agent at time t
is given by:
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(t) 
Z 1
t
[U(Cx(s); Cy(s)) D(Z(s))]e (s t)ds (1)
with U the utility of consumption D the damage function and  the rate
of pure time preference. The utility function has the usual properties,
including homotheticity. The damage function is increasing and strictly
convex in Z; D0(Z) > 0; D00(Z) > 0 for Z > 0: Also, D(0) = 0: The
representative agent maximizes lifetime welfare subject to the lifetime
budget constraint:Z 1
0
exp[ 
Z s
0
r()d ][Cx(s) + p(s)Cy(s)]ds  A0 + T0
where A0 is the initial amount of assets owned by local residents, r is
the gross interest rate, p is the price of the dirty commodity and
T0 
Z 1
0
exp[ 
Z s
0
r()d ]T (s)ds
is the lifetime value of discounted government transfers. Transfers T (t)
are equal to the government revenues from emission taxation, T (t) =
#Z(t). So, the government has a balanced budget in each period. We
also have the household per-period budget identity:
_A(t) = r(t)A(t) + T (t)  Cx(t)  p(t)Cy(t) (2)
The change in assets holdings by domestic residents equals the di¤erence
in income and expenditures, where income consists of the sum of interest
on asset holdings and government transfers. We can retrieve the lifetime
budget constraint by integrating the budget identity and applying the
appropriate transversality condition, lim!1A() exp[ 
R 
t
r(t)ds] = 01:
This completes the description of the demand side of the model.
3.2 Production
Firms in each sector j = x; y maximize the present value of current and
future prots by buying permits Zj from the government and renting
capital Kj from the investment sector. The technology of production in
each sector is subject to constant returns to scale and rms take prices
as given. Discounted prots are:
x(t) =
Z 1
t
[F (Kx(s); Zx(s))  r(s)Kx(s) #(s)Zx(s)]e 
R s
t r()dds (3)
1In the next section it will turn out that, since physical capital is the only asset
in this economy, the amount of asset holdings by domestic residents equals the stock
of physical capital.
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y(t) =
Z 1
t
[p(s)G(Ky(s); Zy(s))  r(s)Ky(s)  #(s)Zy(s)]e 
R s
t r()dds
(4)
F (G) is the constant returns to scale production function of the clean
(dirty) commodity with diminishing returns to each factor of produc-
tion. Two remarks are in order with respect to the production technol-
ogy. Many authors have emphasized that pollution can be equivalently
treated as an output or input to production. For example, Z can be seen
as the use of environmental services as a rm disposes its waste into the
environment. Or, Z can be taken as the number of permits that a rm
has to buy in order to be allowed to pollute (See Copeland&Taylor,
2003). To see this, consider a rm that employs capital as the only fac-
tor of production and jointly produces a commodity X and emissions Z:
The rm has access to an abatement technology that allows it to reduce
the pollution intensity of production :
X =(1  )F (Kx) (5)
Zx= ex()F (Kx)
with ex() = (1   )
1
1  : Then we can rewrite the rms production
technology as a production function with capital and emissions as inputs:
X = F (Kx)
1 Zx
If F (Kx) takes the form of a simple AK production function the
production function e¤ectively turns into a constant returns to scale
production function.
From here on we continue with the input-representation of emissions.
Either way, there exists a price (tax) # for the use of this input (out-
put). Homogeneity of the production functions allows us to work with
output-pollution and capital-pollution ratios. The intensive production
functions are denoted by f and g. The rst-order conditions for an
interior solution can then be rewritten as
r(t) = f 0(kx(t)) = p(t)g0(ky(t)) (6)
#(t) = f(kx(t))  f 0(kx(t))kx(t) = p(t)[g(ky(t))  g0(ky(t))ky(t)] (7)
where kj  KjZj denotes the capital-permit ratio in sector j:We make
the following assumption.
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(A1). The production function f : R+ ! R+ has the usual neo-
classical properties, f(0) = 0; f 0(k) > 0; f 00(k) < 0 for all k > 0: In
addition limk!0 f 0(k) = 1, limk!1 f 0(k) = 0. The function g has the
same properties. Moreover f is more capital-intensive than g; that is,
f(k) > g(k) for any k > 0:
In the sequel we will amply make use of the concept of the factor
price frontier. The factor price frontier of the production function F
is the locus of points (r; #) for which maximal prots are zero. It is
denoted by fpf(F ): The factor price frontier of G; given the price p;
sometimes conveniently phrased as the factor price frontier of pG; is the
set of factor prices (r; #) for which maximal prots are zero, at the price
p: It is denoted by fpf(pG): Both loci are decreasing in (r; #) space, and
due to our assumption (A1), fpf(F ) is less steep than fpf(pG): See gure
1 below.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
3.3 Equilibrium
Market equilibrium for permits and for capital requires
Z(t) = Zx(t) + Zy(t) (8)
K(t) = Kx(t) +Ky(t) (9)
In autarky equilibrium on the goods market prevails if
_K(t) = F (Kx(t); Zx(t))  Cx(t)  K(t); K(0) = K0 (10)
Cy(t) = G(Ky(t); Zy(t)) (11)
Since we abstract from trade in permits we still have (8) for each country.
Since capital is not mobile either, trade is balanced, and net exports
equals net imports for both countries. This implies that total income
equals total expenditures:
F (Kx(t); Zx(t))+p(t)G(Ky(t); Zy(t)) = Cx(t)+p(t)Cy(t)+K(t)+

K(t)
(12)
F (Kx(t); Z

x(t))+p(t)G
(Ky (t); Z

y (t)) = C

x(t)+p(t)C

y (t)+K(t)
 +K(t)
(13)
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and
Cy(t) + C

y (t) = G(Ky(t); Zy(t)) +G
(Ky (t); Z

y (t)) (14)
Regarding environmental policy we assume that the government sets the
emission tax equal to marginal damage of pollution. The pollution tax
is Pigouvian.
4 Autarky
Since the government internalizes the only external e¤ect a general equi-
librium is Pareto e¢ cient. We can therefore characterize the equilibrium
by considering the program that maximizes social welfare. So, we look
at
max
Z 1
0
[U(Cx(s); Cy(s)) D(Z(s))]e sds (15)
subject to (8), (9), (10) and (11). The present-value Hamiltonian reads
H = e t[U(Cx; Cy) D(Z)] + [F (Kx; Zx)  Cx   K] + [G(Ky; Zy)  Cy]
+r[K  Kx  Ky] + #[Z   Zx   Zy] (16)
There exist a solution to this problem. Given our convexity assumptions
it is unique. Moreover, the solution is interior. The necessary conditions
read
@H
@Cx
= 0 : Ux(Cx(t); Cy(t)) = (t) (17)
@H
@Cy
= 0 : Uy(Cx(t); Cy(t)) = p(t)(t) (18)
@H
@Kx
= 0 : Fk(Kx(t); Zx(t)) = r(t) (19)
@H
@Ky
= 0 : p(t)Gk(Ky(t); Zy(t)) = r(t) (20)
@H
@Zx
= 0 : Fz(Kx(t); Zx(t)) = #(t) (21)
@H
@Zy
= 0 : p(t)Gz(Ky(t); Zy(t)) = #(t) (22)
@H
@K
=  

 : _(t)=(t) = +    r(t) (23)
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@H
@Z
= 0 : D0(Z(t)) = #(t)(t) (24)
where  = et; p = =; # = #=; r = r=: For the time being we
are mainly interested in the steady state, characterized by a constant
stock of capital as well as a constant shadow price . From r =  + 
and (19) we obtain kx: Then # follows from (21). Next ky is retrieved
from (20) and (22). We nd p from (20) or (22). Let us dene
+  = f 0(!); +  = pg0( ) (25)
f(!)  f 0(!)! = p[g( )  g0( ) ] (26)
# = f(!)  f 0(!)! (27)
Hence !;  ;
_
p and # are the steady state values of kx; ky; p and #; re-
spectively. From (8) and (9) we get
zx Zx
Z
=
k    
!    = zx(k) (28)
zy Zy
Z
=
!   k
!    = zy(k) (29)
with k = K=Z: Moreover, from (10) and (11) we have
Cx
Cy
=
f(!)zx   k
g( )(1  zx) (30)
Since the utility function is homothetic, relative consumption is a func-
tion of the relative price only, Cx
Cy
= h(p); where h is a function of p:
Through D0(Z) = #(p)Ux(h(p)) we nd the steady state Z = Z: Substi-
tution of h(p) into (30) gives us the solution for the autarky aggregate
capital-permit ratio :
k =
f(!) + h(
_
p)g( )!
f(!) + h(p)g( )  (!    ) =
_
k (31)
Finally, Zx follows from zx and
_
Z.
Note that capital is monotonically increasing or monotonically de-
creasing, since it is the only state variable and the solution is unique.
Moreover, capital approaches a nite steady state K =
_
k
_
Z. We summa-
rize our ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the competitive equilibrium of the Ramsey-
Hecksher-Ohlin model with pollution. In autarky there exists a unique
steady state. The system is globally asymptotically stable.
Now that we have examined the basic properties of the model under
autarky, we turn our attention to a setting with international trade.
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5 International trade
In this section we allow for international trade in goods. Trade is bal-
anced in every period. The problem facing an open economy reads
max
Z 1
0
[U(Cx(s); Cy(s)) D(Z(s))]e sds (32)
subject to
Z(t) = Zx(t) + Zy(t) (33)
K(t) = Kx(t) +Ky(t) (34)
_K(t) = F (Kx(t); Zx(t))  Cx(t)  K(t)  p(t)Xy(t) (35)
Cy(t) +Xy(t) = G(Ky(t); Zy(t)) (36)
where Xy is the net export of the clean commodity. The present-value
Hamiltonian reads
H = e t[U(Cx; Cy) D(Z)] (37)
+[F (Kx; Zx)  Cx   p(t)Xy   K] (38)
+[G(Ky; Zy)  Cy  Xy] (39)
+r[K  Kx  Ky]
+#[Z   Zx   Zy] (40)
For consumption the solution is interior. Hence
@H
@Cx
= 0 : Ux(Cx(t); Cy(t)) = (t) (41)
@H
@Cy
= 0 : Uy(Cx(t); Cy(t)) = p(t)(t) (42)
@H
@Xy
= 0 : Uy(Cx(t); Cy(t)) = p(t)(t) (43)
Furthermore the Hamiltonian is maximized with respect to the inputs
of each production factor
max F (Kx; Zx)  r(t)Kx   #(t)Zx (44)
max p(t)G(Ky; Zy)  r(t)Ky   #(t)Zy (45)
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@H
@K
=  

 : _(t) = ( +   r(t))(t) (46)
@H
@Z
= 0 : D0(Z(t))=(t) = #(t) (47)
Here  = et; p = =; # = #=; # = #=; r = r=: We interprete
r and # as the return on capital and the price of emissions; which is
warranted in a rst best world. In the next section we will examine the
various types of long-run equilibria in this model.
5.1 Identical countries and long-run specialization
patterns.
In this section we assume that countries are completely identical in every
aspect except (maybe) in terms of their initial capital endowments. Since
there are two countries and two commodities there are seven possible
candidates for an equilibrium. Of these seven types of equilibria only
four are distinct because there are three symmetric pairs. We identify
the following equilibrium congurations:
1) Imperfect specialization by both countries, denoted by (F;G; F ; G)
2) Perfect specialization in the clean good by one country, denoted
by (F;G; F ) or (F; F ; G)
3) Perfect specialization in the dirty good by one country; denoted
by (G;F ; G) or (F;G;G)
4) Perfect specialization by both countries; denoted by (G;F ) or
(G;F )
We can make general statements with respect to steady state prices,
ratios and some quantities regardless of the specic specialization pat-
tern. We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A steady state is characterized by (i) factor price equal-
ization (FPE) and (ii) equal ows of pollution across countries, Z = Z:
(iii) Across steady states quantities of world capital and world pollution
are identical.
Proof. (i) In a steady we have r = r =  + : Suppose F > 0:
Then Kx=Zx = ! through f 0(!) =  + : The permit price follows from
# = f(!)   f 0(!)!: It must be the case that #  #. Now suppose
that # > #: This implies F  = 0 because otherwise prots would be
negative. Hence G > 0: From this and the assumption that # > # it
follows that home could make unbounded prots by producing Y , since
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the home factor prices are lower than the foreign factor prices. This is a
contradication and hence # = #: The same reasoning applies if F  > 0:
This completes the rst part of the proof.
(ii) As in the case of autarky the steady state value ofKy=Zy =  and
the steady state price p =
_
p are obtained through the set of equations
_
pg0( ) =  +  and
_
p[g( )   g0( ) ] = # = #: Since preferences are
homothetic relative consumption is a function of the relative price only,
Cx=Cy = C

x=C

y = h(p) where h is a function of p. Then  = 
 follows
from Ux(Cx=Cy) = Ux(h(p)) = : Subsequently Z = Z follows from
D0(Z) = # = D0(Z) = #: This completes the second part of the
proof.
(iii) Denote pollution derived in the previous part of the proof by Z:
We have, allowing for the possibility that a sector is not active,
K =
Kx
Zx
Zx +
Ky
Zy
Zy =
Kx
Zx
Zx +
Ky
Zy
(Z   Zx) (48)
=(!    )Zx +  Z (49)
Similarly
K = (!    )Zx +  Z (50)
So,
K +K = (!    )(Zx + Zx) + 2 Z (51)
Moreover,
Cy + C

y = G+G
 (52)
Cx + pCy = F + pG  K (53)
Cx + pC

y = F
 + pG   K (54)
From utility maximization we have
Cx = h(p)Cy (55)
Cx = h(p)C

y (56)
Hence, after straightforward calculations, and with some abuse of nota-
tion
(K +K) = (Zx + Zx)(f(!) + h(p)g( ))  2h(p)Zg( ) (57)
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Therefore we have two linear equations in the two unknowns K + K
and Zx + Zx: Hence world capital in the steady state follows:
K +K =
f(!) + h(
_
p)g( )!
f(!) + h(p)g( )  (!    )2Z = 2k
A
w
_
Z
where kAw denotes the world-average capital-permit ratio. To see
that kAw is an average we rewrite to see that:
kAw 
f(!)
f(!) + h(p)g( )  (!    ) +
h(
_
p)g( )
f(!) + h(p)g( )  (!    )!
This completes the nal part of the proof.
A steady state with imperfect specialization is any pair fK;Kg such
that K + K =
_
Kw and both countries produce both goods. These
steady states, as do the others, exhibit a very simplied structure: lev-
els of world income, production, pollution and consumption are equal
across steady states. This is a very special result that is uncommon
for models with exible factors of production. The primary reason
for this is that the supply of pollution is independent of national in-
come. With Cobb-Douglas utility, the indirect utility function is linear
in income. In that case the Samuelson rule states that the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and environmental pollution,
D0(Z)=Ux(h(
_
p)) = #(
_
p); is independent of income. As a result, the
supply of pollution is only subject to substitution (price) e¤ects2. Fur-
thermore, all steady states are characterized by factor price equalization
(FPE): interest rates and permit prices are equalized across countries.
This is a distinctive feature of our dynamic model. To see why, consider
the standard static 2  2  2 Heckscher-Ohlin framework with labour
and capital as factors of production. In this setting FPE and imperfect
specialization are two sides of the same coin: if endowments of both
countries lie within the so-called FPE set both countries will produce
both goods (see Dixit&Norman, 1980). Here, on the other hand, we nd
that FPE is consistent with specialization in the very long run (cases
2&3). That would imply that true pollution havens might emerge even
outside your typical North-South setting (Copeland&Taylor, 1994). Be-
fore presenting a diagram that shows all the di¤erent steady states in
fK;Kg space, note that there is another property of the model that
is worth mentioning:
2A dynamic H-O model with capital and labor as factors of production (and
with xed labor supply in each country) would exhibit a similar steady state with
determinate production levels but a-priori unknown trade patterns.
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Corollary 3 The Ramsey-Hecksher-Ohlin model features a scale e¤ect.
Under international trade with two countries all world quantities related
to production, pollution and capital are exactly twice as large under au-
tarky.
This observation follows directly from the previous proposition. In-
terestingly, our model features both neoclassical growth properties and
endogenous growth properties. From the AK-model it inherits the scale
e¤ect 3. In the long-run, however, the model is characterized by zero
growth which reminds us of the Ramsey model.
We now derive the conditions under which each of the steady states
prevails. Consider the set of equations
K +K = (!    )(Zx + Zx) + 2 Z (58)
(K +K) = (Zx + Zx)(f(!) + h(p)g( ))  2h(p)Zg( ) (59)
In the rst equation we have K +K = 2!Z for Zx + Zx = 2Z A
necessary and su¢ cient condition for having a solution with K+K > 0
and Zx +Zx < 2Z is that f(!) > !: Of course, if one is interested in a
steady state this is a natural assumption to make.
Now suppose that there is a steady state with F > 0; G > 0; F  >
0; G = 0: Then K = !Z and Zx = Z. So, the two equations now
become
K = (!    )Zx +  Z (60)
K = Zx(f(!) + h(p)g( )) + Z(f(!)  h(p)g( )  !) (61)
We have !    > 0 and f(!) + h(p)g( ): So, both lines are upward
sloping. Moreover, f(!) + h(p)g( ) > (!    ); implying that the
latter line is steeper than the former. For Z = Z the former yields
K = !Z and the latter gives K > !Z: So, to have an interior solution,
with 0 < Zx < Z we need f(!)   h(p)g( ) < (! +  ). Therefore, if
K = !Z and if bK solves these two equations, the steady state is given
by F > 0; G > 0; F  > 0; G = 0: Obviously, if K = !Z and if bK solves
these two equations, the steady state is given by F  > 0; G > 0; F >
0; G = 0:
Next, suppose that there is a steady state with F > 0; G > 0; F  =
0; G > 0. Then K =  Z and Zx = 0. So, the two equations now
become
3Remember that in section three we discussed the equivalence of our model with
a two-sector AK-model.
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K = (!    )Zx +  Z (62)
K = Zx(f(!) + h(p)g( ))  Z(2h(p)g( ) +  ) (63)
So, again, both lines are upward sloping. Moreover, f(!) + h(p)g( ) >
(!    ); implying that the latter line is steeper than the former. For
Z = Z the former yields K = !Z and the latter gives K > !Z if and
only if f(!)  h(p)g( ) > (!+ ): If that condition is satised we also
have 0 < Zx < Z. Therefore, if K = !Z and if bK solves these two
equations, the steady state is given by F > 0; G > 0; F  = 0; G > 0:
Obviously, if K = !Z and if bK solves these two equations, the steady
state is given by F  > 0; G > 0; F > 0; G = 0:
Finally, suppose that there is a steady state with F > 0; G > 0; F  =
0; G > 0. Then K = !Z and K =  Z: So, K +K = !Z + Z is just
the average of 2!Z and 2 Z: However, the probability that these values
satisfy equations (58) and (59) is zero. Hence, we will almost never
observe a steady state with perfect specialization. The graph below
sketches the steady state equilibrium values of capital.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The identication of the steady state values of capital corresponding
with the equilibrium constellations does not yet answer the question
of the stability of these values. Nor does it solve the way in wnich
convergenge, if any, takes place. This is subject to further research. A
nal observation that can be made from the previous conditions is that
steady states of type 2,3 and 4 are mutually exclusive. To see this, we
dene:
	  f(!)  h(_p)g( )  (! +  )
and Kw as the solution of (58) and (59). Then we can summarize
the previous results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 There exists a steady state if and only if f(!) > !:
Moreover,
1) FGF G , K +K = Kw and  Z < (K;K) < !Z
2) FGF  , 	 < 0; K +K = Kw and K = !Z
3) FGG , 	 > 0; K +K = Kw and K =  Z
4) FG , 	 = 0 and K +K = Kw and K =  Z and K = !Z
The following gure depicts a numerical example of a Lerner diagram
for which 	 < 1:Recall that the Lerner diagram in static trade models
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divides a certain endowment space into various compartments. One
can then relate all endowment points within a particular subspace to a
specic trade pattern.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
In gure 4 we have drawn the cone of specialization with steady
states of type 1 (FGF G) and 2 ( FGF  and FF G) for a particular
set of parameter values. The graph shows how the steady states are or-
dered in fK;Kg space. It can best be understood by rst describing
the various lines that divide the space in 6 subspaces (A;B;C;D;E; F ).
First, there is a straight line on which the quantity of world capital is
xed. Its intercepts with the K-axis and K-axis are giving the coordi-
nates (0; 2kAwZ) and (2k
A
wZ; 0): Second, there are two radial lines from
the origin with respectively slopes of size (k+k
) kx
kx
< 1 and kx
(k+k) kx > 1:
These two lines encapsulate the red segment of the Kw-line that is con-
sistent with imperfect specialization in both countries. In addition, type
2 specialization patterns are found at the edges of the Kw-line.
Next, let us denote the steady state capital stock of home (foreign)
under specialization type i by Ki (Ki ). When Foreign (Home) is spe-
cialized in the clean good we observe that K2 (K2) is strictly larger than
any K1 ; (K1) that is, K

2 > K1 (K2 > K1). In other words, the steady
states with perfect specialization by one of the two countries in the clean
good can be found at the upper-left and bottom-right of the Kw-line.
The explanation is intuitive. For home to specialize completely in the
clean good it has to have a relatively large aggregate capital-permit ratio
when compared with imperfect specialization, k2  k1: Since Z1 = Z2
this also directly implies that K2 > K1: Finally, steady state welfare
in the country that is perfectly specialized in the clean good is strictly
larger than under imperfect specialization. Since pollution damages are
equal in all allocations a su¢ cient condition is that income under com-
plete specialization is higher than under imperfect specialization:
I2 = rK2 + #Z > rK1 + #Z = I1:
which follows directly from K2 > K1: This result can be repeated
for Foreign as well. That welfare is higher under complete specializa-
tion than under imperfect specialization is a typical result in Ricardian
trade theory. Here it is often acknowledged that the largest gains from
trade are for the small country that specializes completely. Here, small
should be interpreted as having a relatively small steady state capital
endowment.
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5.2 Is a patient nation a dirty nation?
In this section we focus on the e¤ects of di¤erences in the rates of pure
time preference. We will keep all other characteristics, such as utility
functions, damage functions and production functions identical. Study-
ing the properties of steady states in this case is interesting for at least
two reasons. Firstly, economists have been preoccupied with this issue
in a trade context for a very long time. A seminal publication in this
eld is by Stiglitz (1970), who studies cross-country di¤erences in dis-
count rates in a Solow-Heckscher-Ohlin model. Secondly, environmental
economists have had a long tradition of interest in the magnitude of
the discount rate. This is mainly because many environmental problems
come into play in the far future and are likely to be with us for many
generations. Surprisingly, di¤erences in the pure rate of time preference
between regions and countries is not very often considered in the eld.
Our environmental specication is rather simple, but having said that,
we still feel that our basic setting is interesting enough to study the rela-
tion between regional di¤erences in discount rates on the one hand and
its e¤ects on regional pollution ows on the other hand.
We consider the case where  > : In the long run  +  = r >
 +  = r: Clearly we cannot have incomplete specialization in both
countries, because that would require equal interest rates. This is sum-
marized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If  +  >  +  then factor price equalization (FPE)
across countries in the steady state breaks down. At least one country
will specialize completely.
Proof. Since  >  we have that r > r. This proves the rst part of
the proposition. Suppose that both countries are imperfectly specialized.
Then (r; #) as well as (r; #) are on the factor price frontier of F as
well as on the factor price frontier of pG; which is not possible. This
completes the second part of the proof.
We show that in principle three steady state trade constellations are
feasible:
Proposition 6 If  +  >  +  the global steady state has only three
possible congurations:
1) imperfect specialization by Home and perfect specialization by For-
eign in the clean good
2) imperfect specialization by Foreign and perfect specialization by
Home in the dirty good
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3) perfect specialization by both countries: Home (Foreign) produces
the dirty (clean) good
Proof. Suppose F > 0:Then # > # because otherwise foreign can make
unbounded prot in the clean good production. If G > 0 then the pair
(r; #) lies below the factor price frontier corresponding with pG. This is
not feasible. Hence G = 0: Hence G > 0 and F  > 0; the latter holding
since the foreign country will use its capital.
Suppose F = 0: Then it follows that G > 0 and F  > 0: Then # > #:
It is possible that G > 0: So we have either GF G or GF :
This completes the proof.
The analysis of the di¤erent cases is analogous to what we did for
equal rates of time preference.
Consider the steady state with F > 0; G > 0; F  > 0; G = 0: Dene
!; !; #; #; p and  by +  = Fk(!); # = Fz(!);  +  = Fk(!); #
 =
Fz(!
); pGk( ) =  + ; and .pGz( ) = #: Moreover, D0(Z) = # and
D0(Z

) = # with  following from utility maximization. It is imme-
diately clear that # < #; implying Z < Z

: Hence the patient country
is su¤ering more pollution. Then, in the case at hand, K = !Z

and
Zx = Z

. So, the two equations now become
K = (!    )Zx +  Z (64)
K = (F (!) + h(p)G( ))Zx + Z

F (!)  Zh(p)G( )  Z!) (65)
We can now pursue the same analysis as we did earlier to determine the
initial capital stocks that will yield this conguration as a steady state.
So, to have an interior solution, with 0 < Zx < Z we need
Z

f(!)  Zh(p)g( ) < Z! + Z 
This condition is similar to the condition f(!) h(p)g( ) < (!+ )
that was needed for the existence of this type of equilibrium with equal
discount rates.
Next, suppose that there is a steady state with F > 0; G > 0; F  =
0; G > 0. Then
K = (!    )Zx +  Z (66)
K = (f(!) + h(p)g( ))Zx   Zh(p)g( )  Zh(p)g( )  Z!) (67)
In a similar way as before we nd that a necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tion for an interior solution for home pollution and capital is
Zf(!)  Zh(p)g( ) > Z  + Z!
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Note that, contrary to the case of equal rates of time preference, the
two conditions are not mutually exclusive. However, they are for G > 0,
F  > 0 and G > 0
Complete specialization o¤ers an interesting case. Clearly we must
have G > 0; F  > 0: Then K=Z is a function of p through pGk =  + 
and # is then also a function of p through pGz = #:We nd K=Z and
# through Fk =  +  and Fz = #
:Again  =  and they follow from
utility maximization, as a function of p: Then we nd Z and Z using
D0(Z) = # and D0(Z) = #; both as a function of p: We also have,
as before,
(K=Z)Z + (K=Z)Z = ZF (K=Z)  h(p)ZG(K=Z) (68)
Since all variables involved only depend on p we can solve for p and
subsequently for all other variables. This then yields a unique set of ini-
tial capital stocks for which complete specialization prevails in a steady
state. Of course it has to be checked whether the price is in between the
prices prevailing in the relevant cases of imcomplete specialization.
Corollary 7 In the long-run the relative impatient country will be a
pollution haven.
Note that this observation is independent of the specic trade pattern
that comes about. The previous proposition showed that if  >  home
(foreign) is always a producer of the dirty (clean) good. From this it
directly follows that home will always be an exporter of the dirty good.
Should we expect this result to go through in more general models?
Not necessarily. Our model has assumed the accumulation of a per-
fectly clean factor. Various additions to the literature on trade and the
environment have assumed a correlation between capital-intensity and
emission intensity in models with three factors of production (labour,
capital and emissions) (Copeland&Taylor, 2003).Incorporating this cor-
relation into our model might lead us to nd that the patient country
will be an exporter of the dirty good. This would completely overturn
our nding. Nevertheless,we can state that regional di¤erences in  are
sure to lead to regional di¤erences in production patterns.
We now introduce an example for illustrative purposes.
Example 8 Take U = CxC
1 
y ; D(Z) =
Z1+
1+
; F = KxZ
1 
x and G =
KyZ
1 
y :
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The possibility of complete specialization can be illustrated as fol-
lows. In that case we have
K
Z
=

+ 
p
 1
 1
;# = p(1  )

+ 
p
 
 1
(69)
K
Z
=

 + 

 1
 1
;# = (1  )

 + 

 
 1
(70)
Also
 =  = (1  )1 p 1 (71)
Therefore
Z = (1  )1 p 1p(1  )

+ 
p
 
 1
(72)
and
(Z) = (1  )1 p 1(1  )

 + 

 
 1
(73)
Moreover, as before
Cy + C

y = G (74)
Cx + pCy = pG  K (75)
Cx + pC

y = F
   K (76)
implying
(1  )K = (1  )F    pG  (1  )K (77)
So,
(1 )(K=Z)Z = (1 )ZF (K=Z; 1) pZG(K=Z; 1) (1 )(K=Z)Z
(78)
The expressions for K=Z and K=Z as functions of p only are known.
This then leads to the following equation for p :
0BB@p
1
1  (1  )

+

 
 1
(1  )

+

 
 1
1CCA
1=
=
(1  )

+

 
 1   (1  )

+

 1
 1
p
1
1 

+

 
 1
+ (1  )p 11 

+

 1
 1
(79)
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From this equation we can solve p and subsequently Z and Z: Finally
we can nd the K and K needed for this equilibrium to occur.
This result can easily be illustrated in an (r; #) diagram. In gure
4 we have depicted the factor price frontier of F and we have xed
r = + and r = +: The points E1 correspond with an equilibrium
where F > 0; G > 0 and F  > 0: The points E2 correspond with F =
0; G > 0; F  > 0 and G > 0: But the latter conguration can also
correspond with complete specialization. However, a clear cut example
of an equilibrium with complete specializationis given by the points E3:
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
The previous proposition reveals two interesting tendencies with re-
spect to the patterns of production and trade when Home is more patient
than Foreign. Firstly, the tendency towards a more specialized produc-
tion pattern.Why is this the case? Imperfect specialization becomes
impossible since factor prices are no longer equalized. Hence, at least
one of the two countries becomes perfectly specialized. In addition, the
global production pattern is more orientated towards the relatively dirty
good. With the world now being more impatient on averagewe nd
that ceteris paribus the steady state levels of capital are lower. From
the Rybczynski theorem we then know that world production will in-
crease in the direction of the dirty good, and more than proportionally
so. Secondly, the direction of the inequality  ?  is a predictor of the
trade pattern.
Corollary 9 In the long-run the relative impatient country will be a
pollution haven.
Note that this observation is independent of the specic trade pattern
that comes about. The previous proposition showed that if  >  home
(foreign) is always a producer of the dirty (clean) good. From this it
directly follows that home will always be an exporter of the dirty good.
Should we expect this result to go through in more general models?
Not necessarily. Our model has assumed the accumulation of a per-
fectly clean factor. Various additions to the literature on trade and the
environment have assumed a correlation between capital-intensity and
emission intensity in models with three factors of production (labour,
capital and emissions) (Copeland&Taylor, 2003).Incorporating this cor-
relation into our model might lead us to nd that the patient country
will be an exporter of the dirty good. This would completely overturn
our nding.
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Proposition 10 Suppose  > : Then in the global steady state Home
will be a Pollution Haven. In addition, we can categorize the following
long-run specialization patterns:
Normal Pollution Haven (FGF ): Home produces both goods and
Foreign produces only clean goods if
Z

f(!)  Zh(p)g( ) < Z! + Z 
True Pollution Haven (GF G): Home produces only dirty
goods and Foreign produces both goods if
Z

f(!)  Zh(p)g( ) > Z + Z!
Let us now focus on the intuition behind the emergence of the three
di¤erent specialization patterns. First, note that Home (Foreign) will
always produce the dirty (clean) good. The reason is that the relatively
patient country will have accumulated a relative large capital stock in
the steady state. Ceteris paribus this implies that Foreign, the relatively
patient country, will have a comparative advantage in the clean good.
Second, what determines the exact specialization pattern in the steady
state are the consumer preferences. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas
utility function above,  indicates the relative preference for the clean
commodity. Therefore, an increase in  will increase the likelihood of
a normal pollution haven, where both countries produce the clean com-
modity. A further sensitivity analysis is subject to further research. But
it can be shown that
Corollary 11 For  >  ( < ) an increase (decrease) in relative en-
vironmental preferences = will increase the likelihood of both countries
producing the dirty good in the steady state.
6 Conclusion
The question of who produces what for whom becomes especially inter-
esting when the what involves environmental degradation. With the
rise of China as the manufacturer of the world this question has be-
come all the more pressing. No wonder that the topic of trade and the
environment continues to evoke discussion in environmental economics.
In this paper we have tried to give what we hope is a new and inter-
esting perspective on the pollution haven hypothesis. We have done so
by emphasizing the dynamic nature of the problem. In our view this
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asks for an integrated picture of trade, growth and the environment.
Our main method of analysis is dynamic trade theory. We construct a
two-country Ramsey-Heckscher-Ohlin model with pollution to consider
(i) long-run specialization patterns when countries are completely iden-
tical and (ii) the e¤ects of cross-country di¤erences in the subjective
discount rate on long-run trade patterns. First, we nd that with iden-
tical countries there are several long-run equilibria with both imperfect
specialization and perfect specialization. All steady states are character-
ized by factor price equalization. Interestingly, the steady state level of
ow pollution is independent of the specic specialization pattern that is
obtained. Second, we nd that if countries di¤er with respect to the rate
of time preference, an important and deep parameter in environmental
economics, at least one country will specialize completely. This holds
for the model in general as well as for the steady state. It opens up the
possibility for so-called true pollution havens: complete specialization in
production of the dirty good by the impatient country. This contrasts
with earlier results in the literature that stressed imperfect specialization
by all trade partners. Since the dirty good is used only for consumption,
true pollution havens are more likely when consumer preferences for the
dirty good are relatively high.
In the previous sections we discussed various long-run implications
of our dynamic trade model. Interesting as this may be, we have not yet
explored local and global dynamics. For example, the question whether
a country will always be a pollution haven once it has started outas
one, cannot be answered without referring to transitional dynamics. In
future work we hope to address these issues in framework(s) that are
closely related to the one that we have set out in this paper. More in
general, theoretical research in the trade-growth-environment nexus has
primarily delivered papers that are either tradeor growth, but not
both. Although such a strict focus has led to many interesting insights,
there are theoretical and empirical reasons that demand an integrated
approach.
From a theoretical point of view one can disentangle two reasons
for an integrated approach. First, asking old questions in a new frame-
work might yield important new results by itself. For example, the
Green Solow model (Brock&Taylor, 2008) shows us that a rather stan-
dard growth model with diminishing returns to capital and technological
progress in abatement yields an environmental Kuznets curve. It also
explains that the point in time that is associated with a peak level of
emissions depends on initial conditions. An integrated model of the
world economy might yield several new insights in this area. One might
be able to derive an EKC for the world as a whole and relate it to the
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distribution of production and income across countries. Can an EKC for
the world as a whole be consistent with periods where emission levels
increase for one country while they are decreasing for another? And how
is the cross-country timing of peak levels in emissions a¤ected by inter-
national trade? How are export patterns related to (relative) emissions
growth rates across countries? Can a country that is on the downward
sloping part of its EKC still be a pollution haven?
Second, an integrated approach allows us to ask questions that are
new by itself. For example, empirial evidence indicates that emissions
intensity di¤ers more across countries than across industries. In addi-
tion, there is evidence that laggard countries adopt cleaner technologies
at a lower level of income than early adopters. Finally, many technolo-
gies, environmental or otherwise, are embodied in capital equipment.
Empirical evidence for the U.S indicates that capital investment is re-
sponsible for more than 50% of technological progress. One possibility to
reconcile this conicting evidence is to construct a dynamic trade model
where capital is heterogenous, i.e., vintage capital. If technology is em-
bodied in capital, developing countries will use older, dirtier vintages
for production because they are cheaper and regulation is less stringent
in these countries. A recent paper by Eaton & Kortum (2001) might
be useful in this regard. Finally, empirical methodologies that are con-
structed by applying closed economy models are no substitute for ones
that are derived from open economy models. Other interesting topics in
international economics have already proved this (See for example Mat-
suyama (2008) on the relationship between di¤erences in cross-country
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector and the decline of the
manufacturing sector in certain parts of the world).
Another interesting avenue for future research is to study the rela-
tionship between (cross-country di¤erences in) environmental policy and
growth convergence in dynamic factor-proportions models with forward-
looking behavior. Recently, a lot of progress has been made in related
work that stresses the interaction between growth and trade in the world
economy (Ventura (1997), Acemoglu & Ventura (2002) and Ventura
(2005)). For example, by combining i) a dynamic version of the factor
price equalization result of international trade and the ii) Ramsey model,
Ventura (1997) shows how poor countries can grow faster than rich coun-
tries if and only if factor prices do not change too fast as the world
economy grows. Once they are integrated in the world economy, inter-
national trade converts an excess production of capital-intensive goods
into exports, instead of falling prices (Ventura, 1997). However, this
conditional convergence result only holds after controlling for govern-
ment policies. It might turn out that cross-country (income-dependent)
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variations in environmental policy a¤ect convergence. Related to this
question, is it true that once a country is a pollution haven it will re-
main so forever? Can government policies overturn this outcome? Or
can they only marginally a¤ect a countrys share in world production
of dirty commodities? We hope to answers some of these questions in
future work.
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7.1 Figures
Figure 3: Lerner Diagram with 	 < 1:
 =  = 0:03;  = 0:7;  = 0:6, = 0:5;  = 0:07;  =  = 1
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Figure 3: Figure 4: Home is Impatient
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